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NOTES
If the right to a jury trial was imposed, maintaining a
separate juvenile court for delinquency proceedings might be
unnecessary because a district .court could hear a delinquency
proceeding as a criminal case with the only difference being the
dispositional alternatives available to the judge. However, such
a move would be undesirable. Although the problems of the
juvenile courts are serious, "the problems of the criminal
courts, particularly those of the lower courts that would fall
heir to much of the juvenile court jurisdiction, are even graver
... "" Furthermore, as delinquency proceedings become
more akin to criminal proceedings, it becomes more likely that
the attitude will develop that juvenile delinquents are no dif-
ferent from criminals.
Dino seems to represent a cautious step forward in the
juvenile due process area; it represents no radical departure
from current thought in the areas of public and jury trials."
Dino also seems to reflect a hesitance to deliver what could be
the coup de grace to the juvenile court with respect to its delin-
quency jurisdiction without allowing time for evaluation of
whether the due process requirements already in effect provide
fundamental fairness to the juvenile making further erosion of
the old ideals unnecessary.
Joseph G. Jarzabek
State v. Nelson: EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE DERIVED FROM A
PRIVATE SEARCH
Having reasonable cause to believe that the defendant had
stolen a diamond ring, two department store security guards
detained him under authority of Louisiana's "shoplifting stat-
ute."' During the detention, one guard, convinced that the de-
62. CHALLm EO, supra. note 7, at 81.
63. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971). In this case, the Alaska Supreme
Court held that the statutory prohibition of jury trial and public trial for delinquents
violated the Alaska Constitution. This is the only decision requiring a jury trial, absent
a statutory mandate, since McKeiver. As to public trial, while the weight of authority
may not be in favor of granting this right, adopting the right to public trial is not
without support either. See notes 35-38, supra, and accompanying text.
1. LA. CODE CraM. P. art. 215(A) states in pertinent part:
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fendant had the ring in his mouth, grabbed his throat to keep
him from swallowing it. While being choked, the defendant
admitted possessing the ring, and this inculpatory statement
was admitted at a trial which resulted in his conviction for
theft. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and held that a
statement resulting from an unreasonable search conducted by
a private person acting under color of statutory authority is
inadmissible under article I, sections 1 and 5, of the Louisiana
Constitution.2 State v. Nelson, 354 So. 2d 540 (La. 1978).
Under the exclusionary rule, no evidence obtained through
a violation of a defendant's constitutional privileges can be
admitted at trial. The rule is designed "to deter-to compel
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it. ' ':'
Prior to 1961, this rule applied to evidence obtained in violation
of fourth amendment protections against unreasonable search
and seizure only when that evidence was offered in a federal
trial. However, in 1961, Mapp v. Ohio4 required the rule to be
enforced in state courts as well.
Whether in state court or Federal court, the exclusionary
remedy is available only when constitutional protections apply,
A peace officer, merchant, or a specifically authorized employee of a merchant,
may use reasonable force to detain a person for questioning on the merchant's
premises, for a length of time not to exceed sixty minutes, when he has reason-
able cause to believe that the person has committed theft of goods held for sale
by the merchant, regardless of the actual value of the goods. The detention shall
not constitute an arrest.
2. LA. CONST. art. I, section 1, states:
All government, of right, originates with the people, is founded on their will
alone, and is instituted to protect the rights of the individual and for the good
of the whole. Its only legitimate ends are to secure justice for all, preserve peace,
protect the rights, and promote the happiness and general welfare of the people.
The rights enumerated in this Article are inalienable by the state and shall be
preserved inviolate by the state.
LA. CONST. art. I, section 5, states:
Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of pri-
vacy. No warrant shall issue without probable cause supported by oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, the persons or
things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for the search. Any person
adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in violation of this Section
shall have standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate court.
3. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
4. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
NOTES
and the United States Supreme Court has never reconsidered
its 1921 holding that the fourth amendment does not apply to
searches and seizures conducted by private persons. In
Burdeau v. McDowell,' officers of the defendant's former em-
ployer searched the defendant's desk and found incriminating
evidence, which later was turned over to federal officers and
offered at trial. No governmental agent participated in the
search or had any prior knowledge of it, so the Court found that
the fourth amendment did not apply and refused to exclude the
evidence.' To the Court, the "origin and history" of the fourth
amendment clearly showed that "it was intended as a restraint
upon the activities of the sovereign authority, and was not
intended to be a limitation upon [anyone] other than govern-
mental agencies." 7 Despite Burdeau's age, state and federal
courts have refused to deviate from its rule requiring the pres-
ence of "state action" before application of fourth amendment
standards.'
5. 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
6. Because this case preceded Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), it originally
applied only to the actions of federal governmental agents. Now, after Mapp, Burdeau
applies to both state and federal officers.
7. Burdeau v. McDowell, 265 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). McDowell's company dis-
charged him for alleged fraudulent business practices. After his discharge, officers of
the company searched his office and seized certain incriminating papers from his desk
and safe. These were turned over to federal prosecutors. The trial court excluded this
evidence, but the Supreme Court reversed, finding that no governmental agent knew
of or participated in the search. The Court stated:
The Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and sei-
zures, and as shown in the previous cases, its protection applies to governmental
action. Its origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint
upon the activities of the sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a
limitation upon other governmental agencies; as against such authority it was
the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of
unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his property, sub-
ject to the right of seziure by process duly issued.
Id.
8. "It is hornbook law that a person is not secured by the Fourth Amendment
against unreasonable searches and seizures conducted by private parties, unless those
parties are operating in the service of some governmental investigation." United States
v. Winstanley, 359 F. Supp. 146, 152 (E.D. La. 1973)(Evidence seized by airline em-
ployee during boarding search held admissible.) See, e.g., United States v. Goldberg,
330 F.2d 30 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964) (Records removed from the
defendant's office without knowledge of federal officers and later turned over to author-
ities held admissible.); United States v. Coles, 302 F. Supp. 99 (N.D. Me. 1969)
(Evidence seized from student at "Job Corps" center by administrator held admissi-
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Under Burdeau, state action can be found only when gov-
ernmental officers participate in or have prior knowledge of a
search. Examples of such participation or prior knowledge in-
clude: direction by police officers to an express agent to remove
suspected contraband drugs from a package;' employment by
law enforcement authorities of an engineer who installed a hid-
den microphone; 0 instruction by police officers to a motel man-
ager to seize suspected narcotics from a room;" and full time
police employment of a part-time nightclub employee who
searched an incoming customer. 2 In each of these cases, courts
excluded the evidence obtained on fourth amendment grounds.
The inflexibility of the Burdeau rule arises from the refusal
of courts to find state action in an indirect connection between
the search and some governmental authority. For example, the
defendant in State v. McDaniel" argued that state action was
present when private security guards detained her pursuant to
a state "shoplifting statute"" and searched her handbag. The
ble.); People v. Randazzo, 220 Cal. App. 2d 768, 34 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 1000 (1964) (store security guard's observation of the defendant in dressing
room putting merchandise in her purse held admissible as evidence.); People v. Botts,
250 Cal. App. 2d 478, 58 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1967) (Observation by service station attend-
ant of defendant using illegal narcotics in restroom held admissible.); People v. Hor-
man, 22 N.Y.2d 378, 239 N.E. 625, 292 N.Y.S.2d 874, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1057
(1968); State v. Bryan, 1 Or. App. 15, 457 P.2d 661 (1969) (In holding evidence ob-
tained in private auto search admissible, the court noted that it had found no jurisdic-
tion in the United States which did not follow the Burdeau rule.).
Although the Burdeau rule has been almost universally adhered to, it has not gone
uncriticized. "Were the Supreme Court faced with the situation in Burdeau again, it
might heed Mr. Justice Brandeis's admonition that 'Respect for law will not be ad-
vanced by resort, in its enforcement, to means which shock the common man's sense
of decency and fair play.". . . [B]ut, in the absence of such a pronouncement, we of
course are bound by the rule in Burdeau." United States v. McGuire, 381 F.2d 306,
313-14 n.5 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1053 (1968) (dictum).
9. Williams v. State, 501 P.2d 841 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972).
10. People v. Tarantino, 45 Cal. 2d 590, 290 P.2d 505 (1955).
11. People v. Fierro, 236 Cal. App. 2d 344, 46 Cal. Rptr. 132 (3d Dist. 1965).
12. State v. Williams, 297 So. 2d 52 (Fla. App. 1974).
13. 44 Ohio App. 2d 163, 337 N.E.2d 173 (1975).
14. The Ohio statute provided:
A merchant, or his employee or agent, who has probable cause for believing that
items offered' for sale by a mercantile establishment have been unlawfully taken
by a person, may, in order to recover such items without search or undue re-
straint or in order to cause an arrest to be made by a police officer until a
warrant can be obtained, detain such person in a reasonable manner for a
1978] NVOTES
Ohio appellate court rejected the argument that a statute
authorizing private security guards to detain ,suspected shop-
lifters constituted state action. Though conceding that the
security guards had violated the defendant's reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy, the court nevertheless refused to exclude
evidence derived from th search."
Louisiana has adhered to the essence of the Burdeau rule
that constitutional protections against unreasonable searches
do not extend to searches by private persons. In State v.
Bryant, 11 decided in 1975, the supreme court refused to exclude
evidence taken by a service station operator from a car im-
pounded by police and left at his station. The court found the
operator to have been acting in his own interest, to prevent
personal liability, rather than as an agent of law enforcement
authorities. 7 In State v. Hutchinson, 18 a co-proprietor of a bur-
glarized business searched the, underside of the defendant's
van, but the court found the unauthorized intrusion to have
been a "private, not public" search and thus beyond the ambit
of the fourth amendment." Chief Justice Sanders, in concur-
reasonable length of time within the said mercantile establishment or the imme-
diate vicinity thereof ....
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.041 (1969).
15. "The same reasoning necessarily applies to the identical contention made
herein with respect to the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures. R. C. 2935.041 does not operate to make the action of a private citizen
thereunder-that is, a merchant or employee-state action within the contemplation
of constitutional prohibitions. 44 Ohio App. 2d 163, 173, 337 N.E.2d 173, 179 (1975).
One of the security guards in this case was a commissioned special deputy sheriff,
but this was not found to constitute state action. 44 Ohio App. 2d at 173-175, 337
N.E.2d at 180.
See also City of University Heights v. Conley, 20 Ohio Misc. 112, 252 N.E.2d 198
(1969) ("[T]he store detective in this was acting as an individual, an agent of her
employer, to protect their property from theft."); People v. Santiago, 53 N.Y. Misc.
2d 264, 278 N.Y.S.2d 260 (1967) (An argument that a shoplifting search took place
under color of state authority was rejected despite detainment under a state shoplifting
detention statute.).
Contra, Thacker v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 702, 221 S.W.2d 682 (1948). In
Thacker the court stated that a private party arresting under a citizen's arrest statute
was "acting for and on behalf of the sovereignty." However, this seems to be an
aberration of the general rule and may have been dictum as the citizen arresters acted
under police direction.
16. 325 So. 2d 255 (La. 1975).
17. Id. at 259.
18. 349 So. 2d 1252 (La. 1977).
19. Id. at 1254.
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rence, found the search similarly beyond the ambit of Louis-
iana's counterpart to the fourth amendment, article I, section
5, of the constitution, which he argued does not extend to
searches by private persons. 2
Apparently, Louisiana has not been willing to' accept the
prior statutory authorization view of the scope of state action,
which was advanced, but rejected, in State v. McDaniel.2' In
State v. Kemp, 2 two defendants sought to exclude evidence
obtained from them by private parties during an arrest which
seemed to fall within the ambit of the Louisiana citizen's arrest
statute.u However, the court did not refer to this statute, nor
did it discuss the possibility of excluding the evidence as the
product of an unreasonable private action authorized by stat-
ute. Rather, rejecting the defendants' argument that the arrest
had been an "official illegality," the court held that the arrest
had been entirely private and that the evidence was admissible
under Burdeau.2' The failure to discuss the statute and the
application of Burdeau are inconsistent with a belief that state
action encompasses private acts authorized by statute. By
admitting the evidence, the court seems to have indicated its
adherence to the traditional view that statutory authorization
is insufficient to bring private acts within the scope of state
action.
State action does, however, include certain acts by state
employees. By so holding, in State v. Mora,2" the Louisiana
20. "If a drastic departure from long-established principles was intended, it
would have been very easy for the drafters of the constitution to so indicate in the
section. In my opinion, the language is not there." Id. at 1255 (Sanders, C.J., concur-
ring).
21. See text at note 13, supra.
22. 251 La. 592, 205 So. 2d 411 (1967).
23. LA. CODE CrIM. P. art. 214 states: "A private person may make an arrest
when the person arrested has committed a felony, whether in or out of his presence."
The article was adopted, without substantive change, from Revised Statutes 15:61
which was in force at the time of the Kemp arrests.
24. "The position defendants have taken is based upon an erroneous premise.
The arrests in question were made by private persons-not by officials. The rules
established by the Federal Supreme Court upon which defendants rely to suppress the
evidence do not apply to arrests made by private individuals, but, instead, they apply
only to illegal arrests, searches and seizures made by officials." 251 La. 592, 603, 205
So. 2d 411, 415.
25. 307 So. 2d 317 (La. 1975), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), 330 So. 2d 900 (La.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004 (1976).
[Vol. 39
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Supreme Court arguably expanded the traditional concept of
who is considered an agent of the state. In Mora, a public
school instructor's status as a state employee, his "strict ac-
countability to the State," and his statutory "responsibility of
implementing the policies of the State,"" were found sufficient
to require exclusion, on fourth amendment grounds, of evi-
dence seized by the instructor from the effects of a student.
Justice Summers, dissenting on other grounds, agreed with the
court that "the Fourth Amendment . . . protects the citizen
against the State itself and all of its creatures-school boards
and school officials not excepted. ' 27 Mora conflicts with United
States v. Coles,"5 wherein a federal district court refused to
exclude evidence obtained by a federally employed Job Corps
administrator on the ground that the fourth amendment ap-
plied only to searches and seizures by law enforcement offi-
cers. 29 If Mora modified the Burdeau rule, it did so by expand-
ing the class of persons considered "governmental
agents"-something the Coles court refused to do. Mora
showed the court's reluctance to limit the application of fourth
amendment standards to actions of police officers only and
perhaps foreshadowed broader application of fourth
amendment-type standards. However, the Mora court did not
26. The Court viewed Revised Statutes 17:416 as the source of this responsibility.
307 So. 2d at 319. That statute states in part: "Every teacher is authorized to hold
every pupil to a strict accountability for any disorderly conduct in school. . . or during
intermission or recess. School principals may suspend from school any pupil who is
guilty of willful disobedience; . . . or who commits any other serious offense. . . .LA.
R.S. 17:416 (Supp. 1975).
The court stated on remand: "Our opinion reflects that we followed three steps in
concluding that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the marijuana seized from
the defendant. First, we determined that the instructor and the school principal who
effected the search and seizure were functioning as governmental agents. This decision
was reached solely by an analysis of Louisiana law." 330 So. 2d at 901. The fact that
the statute was held to confer "governmental agent" status upon the instructor and
the principal should be differentiated from the defendant's argument in McDaniel that
the prior statutory authorization of a private action constituted state action.
27. 307 So. 2d at 322 (Summers, J., dissenting).
28. 302 F. Supp. 99 (N.D. Me. 1969).
29. "Nor has any court extended the rule of the Weeks case so far as to hold that
the Fourth Amendment requires the exclusion of evidence obtained through a search
in which there was no participation or instigation by a federal or state law enforcement
officer." United States v. Coles, 302 F. Supp. 99, 103 (N.D. Me. 1969) (Emphasis
added).
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attack the traditional participation or prior knowledge view of
state action.
The instant case involved a search of the person and ef-
fects of a suspected shoplifter by department store security
personnel acting pursuant to detention powers contained in
article 215 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. A
sales clerk alleged that the defendant had failed to return a
diamond ring shown to him, and the security guards removed
the defendant to an upstairs room. A strip search failed to
uncover the ring, but one guard, thinking the defendant's
speech slurred, thought to look in his mouth where the guard
thought he saw a gold object. When the defendant refused to
spit it out, the guard began to choke him to prevent him from
swallowing it. Thereupon, the defendant admitted possessing
the ring and promised to produce it if left alone. No ring was
found then or later."0 The defendant sought to have the incul-
patory statement excluded from trial, but the trial court re-
fused."
The supreme court initially indicated that the statement
could be excluded as involuntary under Revised Statutes
15:451,32 which applies to any inculpatory statement, whether
or not made to a governmental official. 33 The court admitted
that it could have rested its decision to exclude the statement
on this ground, yet decided instead to base its ruling on the
constitutional issue arising from "the unreasonableness of the
(illegal) search by private persons. '3
30. The guards never found the ring even though they subjected the defendant
to a strip search (while he was handcuffed because of his resistance). Later x-rays and
observation of the defendant's bowel movements failed to locate the ring. Without the
ring, according to the court, the defendant's statement was the only direct evidence
showing his possession of the ring. 354 So. 2d 540, 541.
31. Id.
32. "Before what purposes [purports] to be a confession can be introduced in
evidence, it must be affirmatively shown that it was free and voluntary, and not made
under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements or
promises." LA. R.S. 15:451 (1950).
33. 354 So. 2d at 542. The court cited State v. Glover, 343 So. 2d 118 (La. 1976),
in which the court had stated: "The provisions of Louisiana law establishing that only
free and voluntary confessions and inculpatory statements are admissible draw no
distinction between those made before and after the accused is taken into custody."
343 So. 2d at 120. In Glover an inculpatory statement was made by the defendant to
his common law wife and was overheard electronically by police officers. Nevertheless,
the court applied the voluntariness standard.
34. 354 So. 2d at 542.
[Vol. 39
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The court emphasized that article 215 allows a storekeeper
or his employee "to detain a person for questioning"" only.
Furthermore, "not only must the storekeeper have probable
cause to initiate any inquiry from a customer, but the method
and extent of the inquiry must also be reasonable.""6 The court
found the strip search, the handcuffing, and the choking of the
defendant unreasonable. 7
The Nelson court applied the constitutional standards of
reasonable search and seizure found in article I, section 5, to
the search of the defendant, but did not fully explain the rea-
soning behind this application. After quoting section 5, the
court quoted the final sentence of section 1, which provides
that the state must preserve "inviolate" the constitutional
rights enumerated in later sections." It then concluded: "The
accused was subjected to an unreasonable search under the
color of authority claimed by virtue of a statute that permitted
private persons to use reasonable force to detain him." Since
the inculpatory statement resulted directly from the guards'
search, it was held inadmissible.39
The conclusion that section 5 standards applied to the
private search in the instant case-where only article 215 de-
tention authority connected search and State-indicates the
court's acceptance of a state action doctrine much broader
than the Burdeau prior knowledge or participation rule. The
court's quotation of the final sentence of section 1 immediately
prior to the statement of its conclusion indicates that it viewed
that provision as the constitutional source of such a broad doc-
trine.
Such an interpretation of the final sentence of section 1
deserves much fuller explanation than the court provided.
35. Id. (Emphasis in the original.) For a fuller discussion of the limitations on a
merchant's authority under the source provision of article 215, see Note, Louisiana
Merchant Detention Statute, 25 LA. L. REv. 956 (1965).
36. 354 So. 2d at 542, citing Brasher v. Gibson's Products, Inc., 306 So. 2d 842
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1975). The court added that the guard's use of force might have been
unreasonable even for a peace officer. It cited State v. Tapp, 353 So. 2d 265 (La. 1975),
in which a police officer saw defendant put a tinfoil packet in his mouth and fought
with him for fifteen minutes to prevent him from swallowing it. The search was found
to be unreasonable under the fourth amendment. 354 So. 2d at 542.
37. 354 So. 2d at 542.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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While the sentence is by no means clear, 0 it apparently stands
only for the axiomatic notion that the state cannot directly
interfere with citizens' constitutional rights. However, in the
instant case the state did not participate directly in the viola-
tion of the defendant's right to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure. The court itself found that article 215 con-
veys to storekeepers very limited authority since it does not
allow a search of a suspected shoplifter." Rather, the security
guard, far exceeding his authority under article 215, acted
alone in subjecting the defendant to an unreasonable search.
Seemingly, the Burdeau rule, apparently firmly entrenched in
Louisiana law,'" should have applied to this private action.
Nevertheless, the Nelson court concluded that article 215
colored the search with state authority and therefore called for
the application of constitutional standards-and hence the
exclusionary rule-to the search. Possibly the court felt that
article 215 enhanced the possibility that the private security
guards, given the legal power to detain a suspected shoplifter,
would be tempted to conduct an illegal search of the suspect.
Commentators3 have based a similar argument on Elkins v.
United States," which prohibited federal prosecutors from
using evidence illegally obtained by state officers. The Su-
preme Court believed that to rule otherwise might ultimately
lead federal officers to encourage their state counterparts to
conduct illegal searches in hopes of obtaining evidence not sub-
ject to exclusion.'5 Perhaps the Nelson court similarly feared
40. Delegates who discussed this sentence in the 1973 Louisiana Constitutional
Convention did not speak of its purpose, but rather were concerned only with whether
it would allow waiver of rights, and it was for that reason that the words "by the state"
were added. Louisiana Constitutional Records Commission, Records of the Louisiana
Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts, Vol. VI, Days' 26-42 pro-
ceedings (1977). See also Hargrave, Declaration of Rights in the 1974 Louisiana
Constitution, 35 LA. L. REv. 1, 3 (1974).
41. See text at notes 37, 38, supra. It should be noted that article 215 was not
itself subject to constitutional attack in the instant case.
42. See text at notes 16-29, supra.
43. M. BASSlOUNI, CmZENS ARREST: THE LAW OF ARREST, SEARCH, AND SEIZURE FOR
PRIVATE CmzENs AND PRIVATE POLICE 72 (1977); Comment, Sticky Fingers, Deep Pock-
ets, and the Long Arm of the Law: Illegal Searches of Shoplifters by Private Merchant
Security Personnel, 55 ORE. L. REV. 279, 280 (1976).
44. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
45. Id. at 221-22. The "exclusionary rule" had not yet been applied to searches
by state officers, because this case preceded Mapp v. Ohio.
[Vol. 39
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that a rule which allowed private security guards to detain
suspected shoplifters, yet did not exclude products of unrea-
sonable searches, would lead police" and storekeepers to en-
courage private guards to obtain evidence otherwise beyond
police officers' reach.4"
In Reitman v. Mulkey, S the United States Supreme Court
recognized that an otherwise constitutional law can encourage
unconstitutional actions by private persons. On its face, an
amendment to the California Constitution simplyallowed an
individual "absolute discretion" in dealing with his real prop-
erty. However, the California Supreme Court declared the
amendment unconstitutional-and the United States Supreme
Court affirmed-ruling that it encouraged racial discrimina-
tion by nullifying state statutes outlawing housing discrimina-
tion. The indirect constitutionalization of a "right to discrimi-
nate" was found to "significantly involve the State in private
racial discrimination contrary to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.""'
The instant case compromises between two current argu-
ments in Louisiana concerning the application of constitu-
tional standards to private searches. Chief Justice Sanders, in
Hutchinson, urged that the new Louisiana Constitution does
not deviate from the Burdeau rule.50 Professor Hargrave argues
46. See Comment, supra note 43, at 280.
47. The court in United States v. Goldberg, 330 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1964), rejected
an extension of Elkins to private search cases stating:
[Elkins] reversed the trend of previous federal decisions by refusing to admit
evidence offered as the result of an illegal search and seizure by state officials
even where no participation was had by federal officers. However, here again the
court was only concerned with state action and its ruling, in no wise, impaired
Burdeau v. McDowell. While the appellant contends that "The imperative of
judicial integrity", coined in this case, would be violated in principle, just as
much by a private individual, it is paradoxical that the appellant here should
invoke that doctrine when the material offered in evidence against him was the
true and actual records of his corporation's sales, which were to be destroyed at
his specific direction, and in the face of this fraudulent scheme, to give him the
cloak of its protection would be most unseemly.
Id. at 35. United States v. McGuire, 381 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1967), and People v.
Randazzo, 220 Cal. App. 3d 768, 34 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1000
(1964), rejected arguments based on Elkins on the ground that the Elkins opinion
indicated no intent to overrule Burdeau.
48. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
49. Id. at 376.
50. See note 20, supra. In his dissent in the instant case, Chief Justice Sanders
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convincingly to the contrary that section 5, with or without a
broad construction of section 1, was intended by the drafters
to encompass all private searches, and thus does not follow
Burdeau."5 By requiring that a private search be under color of
statutory authority before constitutional standards will apply,
the Nelson court has taken an intermediate position. For exam-
ple, the Hutchinson and Bryant decisions should remain intact
under Nelson, because the private persons in those cases did
not act pursuant to statutory authorization. However, Nelson
may disturb the apparent Kemp holding by inviting the argu-
ment that article 214's authorization of a citizen's arrest is
sufficient state involvement in any unreasonable search inci-
dent to such an arrest to invoke the exclusionary rule.52
Perhaps the public needs constitutional protection from
private security forces in stores. Certainly the present use of
private security personnel presents the potential for abuse of
advanced the same argument: "I have heretofore expressed the view that the rule
excluding evidence from a criminal trial because of an illegal search does not apply to
evidence secured by private persons." 354 So. 2d at 543 (Sanders, C.J., dissenting).
51. "Furthermore, the debate on the section supports a desire to go far beyond
federal standards and to prevent the use of evidence obtained by private persons in
violation of the guarantees of the section. Delegate Earl Schmitt said: . . . 'This
change will allow the protection of the individual, not only from state action, but from
the action of vigilante committees, from the action of other groups in our society, as
an example, those who hire private detective firms to do what they know the police
cannot do legally.'" Professor Hargrave also presented the opposing argument that
"such a far-reaching departure from existing principles was not intended." This argu-
ment is based on the wording of section 5, which includes the broad "invasions of
privacy" in the first sentence, but then reverts to the traditional "search and seizure"
in the final sentence. Hargrave, Declaration of Rights in the 1974 Louisiana
Constitution, 35 LA. L. REv. 1, 22-23 (1974). The Louisiana Supreme Court recently
stated: "This court has yet to decide whether Article I, Section 5 of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974 bans unresonable searches by private citizens as well as police."
State v. Wilkerson, No. 62,678 (Jan. 29, 1979).
52. In Kemp, both physical and verbal evidence was obtained during the arrest
of the defendants by private persons. Although the court did not so state, presumably
this was a citizen's arrest under LA. CODE CrIM. P. art. 214. Under Nelson, that prior
statutory authorization may call for the application of constitutional standards. Cer-
tainly such an approach would be called for under the Elkins argument. See text at
notes 43-47, supra. A police officer could encourage a private person acting under
article 214 to conduct an illegal search as easily as he could encourage a merchant or
security guard under article 215.
However, this argument might be rejected under Reitman. See text at notes 48-
49, supra. The Supreme Court in Reitman allowed state courts to decide for themselves
whether a law would encourage unconstitutional acts, 387 U.S. at 378-81, and a Louis-
iana court might decide that article 214 furnishes no such encouragement.
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citizens' rights; guards receive little screening or training," and
frequently are unsure of the limits of their authority to detain
suspects. 54 Furthermore, abuses of citizens' rights by private
guards may not be isolated occurrences; in a 1971 national poll,
22 percent of the guards questioned responded that they had
actually seen cases of excessive detentions of suspected shop-
lifters.55
However, while the application of exclusionary policy in
the instant case may please one's sense of justice, the rule
relied on by the Louisiana Supreme Court could have undesir-
able effects in future cases.56 In Nelson, a security guard em-
ployed by a department store" conducted a highly offensive
search which produced, according to the court, unreliable evi-
dence.58 However, the Nelson rule takes none of these egregious
53. J. KAKALIK & S. WILDHORN, PRIVATE POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES: FINDINGS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 30, 76-96 (1971). LA. R.S. 47:374 (1950) provides for a license
fee for private detective agencies, but imposes no minimum standards or regulations.
54. The responses to certain questions are particularly revealing. When asked
how well they thought they knew their legal powers to detain, arrest, search and
use force, 18 percent stated they did not know their legal powers and an addi-
tional 23 percent were unsure of them-41 percent in all. In fact, less than 50
percent knew that their arrest powers were the same as any private citizen's,
and only 22 percent knew under what conditions an arrest for a felony was legal.
Few knew the difference between a felony and a misdemeanor, and some did
not even know whether some actions were crimes or not. For example, 31 percent
believed that it is a crime if someone calls them a "pig," and 41 percent believed
that it is a crime for someone to drink on the job if it is contrary to company
rules. J. KAKALIK & S. WILDHORN, THE PRIVATE POLICE INDUSTRY: ITS NATURE AND
EXTENT 200 (1971).
55. J. KAKALIK & S. WILDHORN, supra note 54, at 223. The authors indicated that
the percentage of those guards who have seen violations is probably higher than the
results of the poll indicated. Some of the questionaires were reviewed by supervisors
before being returned, and some guards may have answered falsely.
56. The court itself stated that the voluntariness standard was available for
exclusion of the statement. 354 So. 2d at 542. See text at notes 32-34, supra. Although
some conceptual difficulty arises in its application from the fact that the force applied
by the guard was only intended to secure physical evidence, this should not prevent
application of the standard. "Article I, section 16 of the Louisiana Constitution pro-
vides that 'No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself.' This provi-
sion suggests that no form of compulsion, whether or not it was intended to coerce a
confession, will be tolerated." State v. White, 329 So. 2d 738, 741 (La. 1976) (Emphasis
in the original).
57. Commentators have argued that large private security forces have a quasi-
public status because they routinely perform a public law enforcement function. M.
BASSIOUNI, supra note 43, at 72; Comment, supra note 43, at 283.
58. 354 So. 2d at 542.
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factors into account. Rather, the decision turns solely on the
statutory authorization of the search and therefore may result
in the exclusion of useful evidence in cases where aggravating
factors are not present. For example, the Nelson rule should
require exclusion of positive evidence of a crime obtained by a
small store owner during an illegal, but inoffensive search."9
Especially since other methods of preventing the abuse of con-
stitutional rights are available, 0 and since businesses require
protection from the mounting costs of shoplifting,6' application
of exclusionary policy may not always be justified.
A California court, in rejecting an argument for the exclu-
sion of evidence derived from an illegal search in a store, stated
that the "dirty business" of shoplifting is more dangerous to
society than the "dirty business" of those trying to prevent it."
This blunt statement indicated the court's fear that exclusion-
ary policy, designed to prevent future illegal searches, will not
deter private security personnel, but rather will only hamper
prosecutions. Another California court, in People v. Botts,3
argued that the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence can
serve to deter only law enforcement officers, because only they
are subject to disciplinary systems which teach them that ille-
59. Brasher v. Gibson's Products Co. Inc., 306 So. 2d 842 (La. App. 2d Cir. i975),
requires that a merchant have probable cause before he detains a suspected shoplifter.
See note 36, supra, and accompanying text. What if the merchant acts upon something
slightly less than probable cause, but nevertheless secures evidence of a theft?
60. A student commentator has demonstrated that Louisiana courts have fully
enforced article 215 limitations, leaving much room for civil recovery against mer-
chants. Note, supra note 35.
Possibly states could require background screening of guards, minimum educa-
tional levels, extensive training, experience levels, and bonding of guards. J. KAKALIK
& S. WILDHORN, supra note 53, at 76-96.
61. As of 1971, an estimated $2-2.5 billion in merchandise was being lost to
shoplifters each year. J. KAKALIK & S. WILDHORN, supra note 54, at 12.
62. Defendant also suggests that the May Company was engaged in "dirty
business" in conducting this surveillance of her and therefore on grounds of
public policy the courts should not permit evidence so acquired to be used. It is
difficult to appreciate the justification for such a charge against May Company
when, without violating any statute, it undertakes to protect its legitimate
business against the thievery of a person who poses as a bona fide potential
customer. It would seem more appropriate to say that the thief was engaged in
"dirty business".
People v. Randazzo, 220 Cal. App. 2d 768, 776, 34 Cal. Rptr. 65, 70 (1963), cert. denied,
337 U.S. 1000 (1964).
63. 250 Cal. App. 2d 478, 58 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1967).
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gal searches can reduce the chances of conviction. 4 The court
concluded that: "The result of applying an exclusionary rule to
cases such as the one at Bench would be to free a guilty man
without any assurance that there would result any counter-
balancing restraint on similar conduct in the future." 5 The
Nelson court did not consider the question of the effectiveness'
of exclusionary policy in deterring private illegal searches-
certainly if exclusion does not deter them, the Nelson rule
will significantly handicap law enforcement while providing
little additional protection for potential victims.
Certainly the Nelson rule is not designed simply to set
guilty shoplifters free; rather the court has tried to strike a
closer balance between the security requirements of merchants
and the rights of their customers to be free from unreasonable
searches.6 The new rule does not encompass all private
searches but instead applies only to those initiated by a private
party acting under some statutory authorization. Louisiana
courts in the future may choose to limit this rule to article 215
detention cases, or, still further, to actions by large security
forces under article 215. 7 Nonetheless, while the size of the step
has yet to be determined, the Louisiana Supreme Court has
stepped away from the previously strict rule that the constitu-
tional standards governing search and seizure do not apply to
searches by private persons.
Shaun B. Rafferty
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN LoUISIANA-THE REJECTION OF THE
LOCALITY RULE AS APPLIED TO SPECIALISTS
The wife and children of the decedent sued his cardiovas-
cular surgeon for wrongful death. Although the defendant had
complied with local practices,' the testimony of a specialist
64. 250 Cal. App. 2d at 482-83, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 416. See also State v. Mora, 307
So. 2d 317 (La. 1975), wherein Justice Summers, in dissent, argued that exclusion does
not deter private unconstitutional conduct.
65. People v. Botts, 250 Cal. App. 2d 778, 482-83, 58 Cal. Rptr. 412, 416 (1967).
66. Note, supra note 35, at 964.
67. See note 57, supra.
1. Ardoin v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331, 1333 (La. 1978).
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